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If war comes, Ethiopia must take political measures besides defensive actions.

Associate Professor Medhine Tadesse
Associate Professor Medhine Tadesse is one of the leading East Africa conflict resolution researchers. He wrote a book on the Ethio-Eritrea conflict in English, and another book, "Al-Itihad", in Amharic, focusing on fundamentalist activities in the region. He has prepared numerous research papers related to the political situation in East Africa.

Recently, since the Eritrean government restricted the movement of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), which patrols the security zone between the two countries, tensions have been getting high along the two countrie's border. Both countries are moving their forces closer to the border. And the international community fears that there could be a repetition of the 1998-2000 war between the two countries. Bruck Shewarged of The Reporter sought Medhine's view on the possibility of another round of war with Eritrea. Excerpts:

Now that Eritrea has restricted the movement of UN Peacekeepers, and the latter is pulling out of half of their monitoring stations, isn't war between Ethiopia and Eritrea inevitable?

I think, what Eritrea did, that is, restricting the movement of UNMEE, is stepping over the line. The government of Eritrea tried several methods before to influence the UN in the hope of indirectly creating pressure on Ethiopia. But this is serious. For example, if Eritrea banned helicopters' flight for five days and then let them resume flights, it would be considered as the usual tactic of creating pressure on UNMEE. But now the measures taken will affect the entire Transitional Security Zone (TSZ) which the peace-keepers are monitoring.

One of the core points of the Algiers Agreement is secession of hostilities. And if the security zone ceases to function, the seccession of hostilities will be in question. The two countries' forces are a short distances away from each other.

The Eritrean government took a step that it can't reverse. Now, it is a matter of pride. The government can't lose face. Had it moved a little bit, it would have been able to step back. So the possibility of another conflict is high. There is also another possibility. If it can meet its goal in another way, it need not go to war. But if it is convinced that it won't meet its target in any other way short of war, I think it will resort to armed engagement.

Here, we have to see what the goal of the Eritrean government is. It is to put pressure on the international community to force Ethiopia to accept the border ruling. Ethiopia's acceptance is not simply enough. Ethiopia has to accept it because it is forced. This is the calculation of the Eritrean government. They believe that this pressure on Ethiopia will escalate the political crisis in the country. It will be humiliated because it is forced by Eritrea and bow to international pressure.

This is the main goal of the government in Eritrea. There must not be any confusion. The first target of Eritrea is not a territorial claim. If this does not happen, the other way to heighten the political tension is to mount a sudden attack on Ethiopia and to score a victory. So what the first calculation could not bring about a result can be achieved through the latter. Whether there is going to be a war or not, the Eritrean government is intent on putting pressure on Ethiopia and force it to accept the decision by the Border Commission. Subsequently, there is the expectation by Eritreans that Ethiopia's submission to such a pressure will further exacerbate the local political tension. So, whether this expected result is to come through pressure or war, we will see it in the near future.

Why did the Eritrean government choose particularly this time?

Well, there might be three reasons for the timing. First comes the Eritrean A military preparations. I think the government there has made military preparations over the past four or five years, probably more than enough preparations. They evaluated their military performance in the past and are convinced that corrective measures were taken.

While the Algiers Agreement in 2000 summoned a period of cessation of hostilities and demobilization, Eritrea chose the path of remilitarization and rearmament.

This shows that Eritrea did not accept the Algiers peace treaty whole-heartedly. It seems the military strength seems to matter for them. The recent cabinet meeting of the Eritrean government concluded that its military is capable of regaining Eritrea's sovereign territory. The Eritrean National Security Strategy reached the conclusion that the country had the capacity to reclaim its land.

In fact, they went further to even coming up with a theory by their defence minister which summarizes that "the small Eritrea can prevail over Ethiopia". This is their conviction.

The second reason could be, I think, the political situation in Ethiopia. They base their reason on the fact that there is political tension is Ethiopia. The government is confronted by different opposition parties and this could be the right time for them. If their military action is coupled with the instability within Ethiopia, it can bring the expected result. This could be their calculation.

The third reason could be, I believe, the question of the Eritrean government's legitimacy in the country. The legitimacy is based on Eritrea's military superiority over its neighbours, specially Ethiopia. This is the image that the government has generated. This is their source of legitimacy. The former liberation movement, which is now ruling Eritrea, has nurtured Eritrean nationalism based on this military superiority over others. So their legitimacy lies with such superiority over Ethiopia. This notion gained ground, especially, after the fall of the Durgue in 1991. After the Durgue's fall, the notion of their greatness, their power served as their source of legitimacy.

Beside this, the leadership is convinced that Eritrea's acceptance internationally is tied to its military strength. Just as the state of Israel is conceived in the Middle East, Eritrea's leaders think that Eritrea is a country which can shoulder the responsibility or the mission to ensure peace and security in the African region.

On behalf of the powerful western countries?

That's it. That was the image they were selling. It has also the implication of economic benefit. The military capacity build-up has economic, political, legitimacy and the purpose of international acceptance. I think this was shattered during the war with Ethiopia. It is a sour point which they have to reverse. If they want to maintain their legitimacy, they have to do something about it. In light of this, it would be a matter of revenge. They want to reverse, somehow, the story of the past war for which they lost their face. So, this could be the right time, according to their consideration.

Eritrea has many times disregarded the Algiers Agreement. The international community is asking Ethiopia to accept the Algiers agreement, part of which is the border commission's ruling. Can Ethiopia be forced to accept it?

For me, the Algiers Agreement is a security agreement, first and foremost, then, the establishment of the border commission as a result of the agreement. But first it is a security agreement, seccession of hostilities, military truce and establishing the security zone for ensuring these conditions.

If this is violated on the other's part, I think, Ethiopia can no longer be forced to abide by the agreement. There could be a procedure for abandoning the agreement. But if Eritrea goes against the agreement, and the evidence so far indicates that, then Ethiopia can revoke the Algiers Agreement, too.

This is not good for Eritrea. The process of the country's seccession from Ethiopia and the establishment of a fully independent and sovereign Eritrea with recognized borders will be prolonged. The question of the port, border demarcation and sovereignty will remain open.

The international community's insistence that Ethiopia's should accept the border commission's ruling is not something unusual. But what they should ask is whether this will solve the problem. This simplistic view is the problem with Westerners. There is one point that the international community missed.

Even if Ethiopia abides by the border commission's ruling and handover of some of its territory, I don't think Eritrea would be satisfied and stop at that. In the first place it is not a question of land. The Eritrean government sought after the instability and disintegration of Ethiopia. The westerners think the implementation of the ruling will bring peace. But the problem lies with the strategic view of the Eritrean government. They want a weak Ethiopia with no strong central government authority which is susceptible to the influence of Eritrea, where its military can economically prevail. The largest modern economy in Eritrea is its military. They are even involved in smuggling alcohol into Arab countries. They believe that Eritrea can economically benefit when Ethiopia is internally divided.

If border demarcation doesn't solve the two countries' problems, why then, in the first place, the need to do that?

At the time, both countries agreed to the demarcation process based on their own expectations. Ethiopia at the time took the view that the land belongs to it, Eritrea invaded and tried to take it away, and then it regained the land through the use of force. And it believed that the ruling by the international body will put a seal on the issue. Ethiopia did not get what it wants from the commission. Neither did Eritrea, though it did if you see it from reverse angle.

How?

Well, Eritrea knew that it was militarily defeated. Going to the arbitration or the commission's ruling will be a safe exit. Since it lost the war already, it wouldn't do any harm to look for a way out through the litigation process. Now, the biggest problem is the ruling. Not only is it unjust but it also opens the door for another circle of violence. No international lawyer or analyst expected such a decision. The only way to implement the decision is through another round of war.

What concrete steps can Ethiopia take?

If war comes, Ethiopia must take political measures besides defensive actions. It must revoke the Algiers Agreement.

Does that include the border commission ruling?

Everything. Even Eritrea's sovereignty will be in question. One of President Isayas' lifetime project is to hand over to the next generation a county which is fully independent and recognized internationally with demarcated borders. This project might be frustrated. For Ethiopia, I don't think it will be difficult to stop any military action from Eritrea. Rather, avoiding the problem that emanates from the Algiers Agreement could be more difficult. Otherwise, there is no way for Eritrea to mount a large-scale offensive, defeat Ethiopia and occupy its territories unless the Ethiopian state disintegrates.

Currently there is political instability in Ethiopia. Military personel are scattered around the country. Should Eritrea decide to attack right now, wouldn't it diminish the capability of Ethiopia's army to fend off the aggression?

In order to answer this question, you have to study the capacity of Ethiopia's army based on empirical evidence. You have to see the number, the quality of the training, the mobility of the army etc. It could be difficult for me to determine that exactly. You also have to know whether the army is politically divided or is full of problems. For the time being we can ask whether Eritrea's intention to attack is based on this notion. This is a concern for Ethiopia.

The leadership in Eritrea thinks that Ethiopia and Sudan are destined to be disintegrated. The argument is which one of the two will disintegrate first. The question for Ethiopia remains how much Ethiopians are ready (like in the former war) to stand together and fight back any attack by Eritrea. One has to see the fact that Eritrea's attack is intended to exacerbate the political situation here and to destroy the country.

Following the 1998-2000 war, you said that both countries cannot afford another round of war. If conflict arises now, can Eritrea sustain the war economically?

They don't have an economy capable of sustaining a war. But that doesn't mean that they will not go to war at all. They were militarily and economically exhausted when they signed the Algiers Agreement. The military capacity and the preparations made by Eritrea are beyond the economic capacity of the country. This indicates that there are sources other than the economy. When we see the Eritrean state, we shouldn't evaluate it as a conventional state. It has its own category. It is not like the conventional state that you find in Ethiopia or Kenya. They have no formal economy. When other countries ban contraband trade, Eritrea promotes it. Because it has no formal economy and formal social services, it seems to resort to the informal. I think, it can support a war informally. If not as a country, the ruling body can stay afloat as a group and intimidate and mount some attack on Ethiopia and try to weaken it. Waging big war is beyond their capacity. But they can add fuel to the political situation in Ethiopia. Prevailing over Ethiopia militarily is virtually impossible.

Eritrea enjoys economic support from some Arab countries. Can't this give them the edge over Ethiopia?

They have the capacity to create a problem for Ethiopia. But they can't conduct a total war against Ethiopia which requires a big economy. And I don't think they want that. All they want is to humiliate Ethiopia and to regain the face they lost during the war.

Is Ethiopia as weak and divided as they want it to be? Is Ethiopia's strength as good as the last time when the two counties went to war?

It could or could not be. What matters is that they think that way. They had that calculation last time when they invaded Ethiopia. They found it to be wrong.

Back then, though there was not political problem like this time, they were convinced that the federal arrangement along ethnic lines had alienated the people and there was no cohesion and unity. It was not the case.

The Eritrea leadership still thinks that way. Is the situation the same as the past? It should be studied, I think, before one answers that. Did the current situation charge Ethiopia's tradition of leaving differences aside in the face of foreign aggression? This needs to be carefully studied, too. But Eritrea think that way.

Some think that if war comes, the oppositions will be compelled to work with the government. And this will give a breathing space for the government and, in fact, strengthen it, paving the way for the demise of democracy in Ethiopia for good. On the other hand, if they don't cooperate, the country will be gone. What do you think will happen?

I don't think democracy will disappear forever. If we understand the intension of Eritrea, what matters remains to be keeping the country on its two feet. The democratic process in Ethiopia is not completely reversible.

If war comes, opposition parties must stand alongside the government and the people. You cannot democratize without the state. Democracy will only be meaningful with the state. So the direction everyone must follow is to respect or ensure the country's sovereignty.

Can't the Ethiopian government equally push the Eritrea state into chaos? And won't this create security problems for Ethiopia later due to Eritrea's instability.

The current condition seems to indicate that if Eritrea attacks, Ethiopia should take the war to Eritrea. That remains the only option.

Even go to Asmara and topple the government there?

Yes, of course. It's a matter of security. The government there time and again has challenged Ethiopia's democracy, economy and security. At first, it was conceived as claiming land. But now their intention is beyond that. As long as the Eritrean leadership is there, Ethiopia's national security is under threat. Eritrea is now Ethiopia's number one problem. This should be dealt with earlier. But even now Ethiopia has to stop the Eritrea government.

But since Eritrea has not evolved into a strong state, by removing the ruling party from power, won't Ethiopia bring chaos to that country? Is there any single force in Eritrea other than the current leadership that can keep the country together? Won't the case of Somalia be repeated?

The repetition of the Somali case is a small possibility. Somalia has gone from a state to a stateless situation. Eritrea doesn't have a state or developed one. It is only in name. There is only a military power which controls the area in the name of an Eritrean state. It is not a conventional state. The other point is that although there is no opposition entity capable of confronting the leadership militarily, there is a strong pro-democracy movement with a strong political base. There is a sort of an umbrella organization consisting of nearly 20 parties. So we can't say there is no alternative force.

The military too would not totally reject another force to rule Eritrea although there is no possibility of going directly against the current leadership. So the disintegration factor is not that much a matter of concern. They can get back together.

Also you have to ask whether smaller groups in Eritrea can be more dangerous than the current government is. I think the current leadership in its present from, i.e., well organized and with hostile intent, is much more of a threat to Ethiopia.

But there still will be a power vacuum for some time. And given the lingering problem of fundamentalism in the region, won't some small groups become the clients of the fundamentalist from the Middle East for money? Isn't this a serious threat?

Such a situation might take place if there was no alternative force. There is an opposition camp encompassing all the people of Eritrea. This opposition grouping even tried to establish a government in exil had it not faced some obstacles. This umbrella organization of the opposition even includes the two main Muslim fundamentalist parties in the country. So the threat of fundamentalism coming from the Middle East is less. Formerly, in fact, such kind of fundamentalist activities used to come from Sudan. But it is now being neutralized in Sudan. So, I don't think any Jihad group will have a better chance than others to dominate Eritrea like what we saw in Afghanistan.

Although, Eritrea has a large number of Muslims, it is not a Muslim country. The Tigrigna speakers in Eritrea are likely to retain supremacy in the country. They are well educated, a high number of population, and the geographical area they occupy is big. It is well organized. So the threat of fundamentalists taking over is minimal.

This possibility can be seen as one problem. But it is not reason enough not to remove the current leadership from power.

Has the Ethiopian government made preparations to avoid the mistake it committed in 1998.

I believe that since the last year, the government of Ethiopia is making the necessary preparations. How well prepared it is will remain a military secret. But Ethiopia will not be caught unprepared like the last time.

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