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Ethiopia and Eritrea - Fear For Fuming Fight– February 22, 2007 By: Lillian WestIntroduction Relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia have been strained since Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993 following a 30-year guerrilla war. As a matter of fact, tensions along the heavily militarized Ethiopia-Eritrea border escalated since late 2005 during which time Eritrea imposed new restrictions on the movement of the UN-peacekeeping mission mandated to monitor the demilitarized zone established by the 2000 Algiers Agreement. The breakdown of the 2000 cease-fire of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute and realization of the peace attainment process has actually resulted in the current stiff stalemate. To add insult to injury, the turbulent border dispute has further been fueled and continues to boil-over by the mounting opposition politics on either side of the two archenemy governments that continue to respond with harsh restrictions, arrests and with criminalizing of difference of opinions coming from their respective opposition groups. Hence, in this article, to my readers and concerned stake holders benefit, I would like to provide a glimpse of accounts on current frictions and factions that flared-up and triggered the lingering Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute. The article mainly summarizes details on the record and situation on the ground between: democratic traditions and dictatorship, honesty and betrayals, diplomacy and tact, political dodgers and honest brokers, success and setbacks, lessons learned and hints for the way forward. Fear for fresh fighting flanked by two-foes
Actually, in November 2006, Afeworki ambitiously and enthusiastically said that: "The border problem is a solved problem", reiterating Asmara's long-held position that the independent border commission's ruling was final and binding. In his view the 2000 Algiers peace agreement and the 2002 border ruling ended the problem (For details see 18). As his go-getting assertion was not holding water, Afeworki blamed the United States for blocking the implementation of the border ruling and its historical role that favored the existence of Ethiopia over its tiny northern neighbor, sparking a protracted independence struggle. Afeworki look for: "Why it was not implemented? And tried to reason by stating: “Because the US doesn't want to implement the decision. They like to live on conflict. They create conflicts and exploit. That's it." (For details see 18). Indeed, Eritrea had complained repeatedly that the international community had not done enough to demand that Ethiopia accept the new border and had steadily ratcheted up rhetoric and pressure to push its point. But Meles Zenawi maintained that the ruling that awarded the flash-point town of Badme to Eritrea risked splitting families and communities on either sides of the border divide lines. To show its displeasure to the world body, Afeworki’s regime slapped restrictions on patrols by the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in its territory and expelled its entire European and North American staff. Instantly, the UN accused Eritrea of moving about 1 500 troops and 14 tanks into the demilitarized buffer zone on its border with Ethiopia in a "major breach" of a bilateral ceasefire. Mockingly enough, as though one make use of tanks as combined harvesters in the demilitarized zones, Afeworki’s regime argued that Eritrean troops were deployed to harvest crops and blamed Ethiopia for forcing it to use its military to do the field-works of civilian farmers. Afeworki even maintained that the real "major breach" of a 2000 peace deal that ended a very bloody two-year border war between the two nations was Meles Zenawi’s refusal to accept a new frontier demarcation that emanated from the agreement. He has long complained that Ethiopia violates the peace deal by refusing to accept the binding ruling by an international boundary commission; and accuses the UN of failing to put enough pressure on Zenawi to accept it. Desire to Determine Demarcation Disputes On his part Meles criticizes the UN Security Council for failure to take action on Eritrea's deployment last year of troops and tanks into a frontier buffer zone. In recent talks with Pierre Chevalier, Belgium's envoy to the UN Security Council, Meles actually claimed that it was "inappropriate" for the world body "to fail to take measures when Eritrean troops crossed a temporary security zone". According to Meles, "the issue of demarcation of the boarder should be resolved through dialogue." (For details see 17). Chevalier said that Belgium "would hold discussions with the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea to address the problem regarding the boarder dispute." (For details see 17). In January 2007, the Security Council extended the mandate of the UNMEE force for six months, to July 31, 2007 but decided to reduce its strength from the current 2 300 to 1 700. The border stiff stalemate has left the status of the 1 000km frontier dangerously unclear more than six years after the peace deal ended the 1998-2000 war and has raised tensions. Thus, with the clouds of war hanging over the horizon of the buffer frontier and amidst Afeworki’s regime progress plans for Eritrea, most Eritrean people find little reason to begin revitalizing the national economy while the stalemate with Ethiopia still remains unchanged. What the Eritrean public aspires to see in actual fact is peace with Ethiopia and Eritrea. In their view Eritrea cannot grow as a progressive country if the stalemate with Ethiopia doesn't change. Airy Arbitration Attempts and Apt Applications
In other words, the
trouble over the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute is with the assumption
of deciding borders based on colonial treaties ... and on the realities
of power during the 1998-2000 war held between the two nations. For both
Ethiopia and Eritrea it means to reconsider on how to come to terms with
the redefinition of borders along ethnic, religious, or linguistic fault
lines. If this action is not taken with due caution, respect to one
another and willingness to arrive at consensus between the two feuding
regimes, then the lingering dispute will have more devastating
repercussions than the 1998-2000 hostilities. Access to the Sea via Assab
In deed, in reality, the TPLF-EPRDF government must side-step the Algiers Agreement as the contents of this agreement are lop-sided and partial. The reason for considering it as null and void is crystal-clear. Looked at from pure legal perspectives, Eritrea has consistently violated the accord by over-stretching the terms and the period set in Algiers Agreement for which Ethiopia cannot be held accountable any more. Many concerned Ethiopians have steadily written about the Assab Port and Ethiopia's access to the sea both prior to and after the 1998 and 2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia border dispute. I will summarize some of such articles below. Firstly, in an article written at the time of the signing of the Algiers Agreement by Teshome Abebe (12), Teshome argued that the Agreement was lop-sided, biased, misleading and was more beneficial to Eritrea than to Ethiopia. Calling for justice be done unto Ethiopia’s border stance, and with due urgency of the matter at that time, Teshome attempted to appeal to EPRDF-regime and to concerned Ethiopians not to rush to sign the Algiers Agreement without careful deliberation; and without taking alternative and/or feasible consideration of critical matters that need to be resolved; including that of maintaining a corridor to Ethiopia’s rightful access to the sea. But things went the unexpected way, once again, leaving Ethiopia’s rightful access to the sea in limbo. Secondly, in recent articles produced both by Alex Birhanu and Getachew Reda respectively, the authors strongly make a case by pointing out the seriousness of the matter and by suggesting the need for meticulous and systematic examination of the pressing security and socio-economic factors that legitimize Ethiopia’s access to the sea. Mr. Birhanu and Mr. Reda urge stakeholders to come-up with affordable and agreeable consensus on succulent, succinct and critical factor pertinent to Ethiopia’s inalienable access to the sea. To these authors, if maintaining stability and socio-economic relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia is to be forged and sustained, then justice has to be done to unjustly landlocked 80 million peoples of Ethiopia (For details see 4 and 5a). Essentially, better late than never, Assab Port’s significance to Ethiopia must thus be taken into momentous consideration and be given topmost priority in order to arrive at meticulous and monumental decisions as Assab Port is one of the crucial life-lines of Ethiopia given away without fair deal.
Indeed and very truly
indeed: “The national
security and economic well-being of Ethiopia was unfairly compromised in
early 1990s by EPRDF leadership. This regime should have researched
precedent cases, consulted experts, and waited until it had the mandate
from the Ethiopian people, by way of election, to enter into lasting
international agreements involving Ethiopia. But as the result of its
earlier inexperience, EPRDF leadership took Afeworki’s words at its
face-values and signed for the de facto independence of Eritrea without a
written and binding agreement that mandated and secured Ethiopia’s access
to sea. One cannot fathom how Zenawi who in 1991 told David Mercer that
he “wanted to make Ethiopia a big player in the Middle East; ranking
alongside Egypt” failed to appreciate the importance of secured access to
the Red Sea to achieve this very vision. The Ethiopian government has a
second chance to secure Ethiopia’s access to sea through negotiation when
and if the border demarcation talks with Eritrea resumes in future.
Unless Ethiopia gains her own legitimated access to sea, as she used to
have until 1990, there will never be a lasting peace between Ethiopia and
Eritrea. Let us not mistake the “absence of war for peace.” Ethiopians
will have to continue to go to war for their rightful access to the sea
because their continued existence depends on it.” [For details, see (3)]. The only means to settle this sensitive Assab Port issue is by coming to a negotiated settlement in which Eritrea is provides an outlet within its abundant sea coastal lines. Due to its vested economic, security and political interests, Ethiopia should be given a corridor in order to maintain its access to the sea. Likewise, Eritrea should be compensated by sharing resources Ethiopia has at its comparative advantage. And if the two nations can come to a mutual accord and continue to satisfy their respective urge with harmony, then lasting peace is coming to be evident [For details please read (4) and (5)]. Actually, after the December 2006 mission of thwarting the Islamic fundamentalists in Somalia, most Ethiopians anticipated with significant optimism that the EPRDF regime’s armed forces may turn their direction towards the North and pursue Afewerki’s solitude administration forcefully from its power base in order to halt completely the insurgency troubles Afeworki has been propagating inside Ethiopia and within the region. But the EPRDF-regime is undecided; and still shrugging its shoulders as regards Ethiopia’s access to the sea. Adamantly, this regime continues to grumble Ethiopia’s rightful ownership of Assab Port while at the same time remaining steadfastly alert and on the watch until the first fire is triggered from the other end of the disputed border divide-lines. Summarily stating, many Ethiopians continue to convey a clear-cut opinion indicating that matters pertaining to Assab Port remain in the hands of the EPRDF-regime that holds upfront and fiery responsibility to retake the legitimate Ethiopian access to the sea. Assab is Ethiopia’s inalienable contact with the outer world. Hence looked at with all evenhandedness, there is no justifiable ground to leave Ethiopia’s 80 million populations land-locked while Eritrea (with its nearly 4.5 million populations), is left free of charge to gain access to both ports of Massawa and Assab as well as the vast coastal area (For details see 4 and 5a). That means, without further delay, “Ethiopia must stage-up the pending border dispute including that of the Assab port as points of finding the middle ground between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Likely justification for Ethiopia’s access through Assab port would be that: (a) Ethiopia needs an outlet to the see in order to maintain its national geopolitical security and its socio-economic interests; (b) for quite a long while until the early 1990s, Assab Port used to be part of the Wollo Administrative region of Ethiopia; but this Port was given away by TPLF to Eritrea as a good will gesture and without the consent of or holding referendum by the Ethiopian peoples; (c) the 1993 Eritrean referendum was conducted on emergency grounds; without formally conducting the border demarcation prior to the 1993 de facto Eritrean independence inauguration date (For details see 15); (d) with its nearly 80 million peoples living landlocked inside Ethiopia it feel like living in a closed house arrest without having open access o the outer-world; and, (e) it is a matter of time; keeping Ethiopia landlocked will simply prolong the sources of constant tension and fear factors for war as well as the suffering of the peoples of Ethiopia and Eritrea alike (For details see 14). When all's said and done, one thing is infallibly and undoubtedly clear. EPRDF must steadfastly arrive at the middle ground with which to regain the hitherto lost opportunities and bring force to undertake that Assab Port so that the Port issues will not stay behind and become as a permanent source of future instability between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Scary Set of Sectarian Connections From day one, Eritrean opposition groups, known as the Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA), operating both from Sudan and Ethiopia have joined voices with the AU and the UN, and are strongly opposed to the Eritrean government's recent act of aggression behind the now crushed Islamic fundamentalist leadership in Somalia. Afeworki’s constipated connection in his attempt to wage a proxy war against Ethiopia was quite desperate and agonizing. According to a United Nations report, prior to the December 2006 clean-up fighting held against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia, hundreds of Islamist fighters were flown, with Eritrean assistance, from Somalia to Syria and Libya for military training. Others were taken to Lebanon to fight with Hezbollah; the report to the UN Security Council has revealed (For details see 6 and 7). A clandestine operation to smuggle the fighters out of Somalia began in July 2006. In connection to this, in an interview, Evgueny Zakharov, the owner of Aerolift, an airline with a fleet of ageing Antonov and Ilyushin transport aircraft, based in Johannesburg but registered in the British Virgin Islands, said: “We transported lots of Arabian men in uniform and with masks.” Zakharov said his involvement began after he was approached by a General Tambi of the Eritrean People’s Defense Forces. Eritrea was a major supporter of the Islamists in Somalia. Tambi offered to buy Zakharov’s Ilyushin 76 transport aircraft carrying the Kazakhstan registration number UN 76496 for $1.5m (£770,000), even though the normal price for an aircraft of that vintage and condition is just $1m. Zakharov went ahead despite the unusual contract conditions that stipulated secrecy. He insisted the contract should specify that the new owners were not to use the aircraft to make arms flights. However, “… the Ilyushin made three sanctions-busting arms flights to Somalia from the Eritrean port of Massawa, bringing out the masked men on the return legs. “I do not know who they were but you can draw your own conclusions,” he said. Zakharov’s revelations came as western security services continued their investigation into foreigners suspected of fighting on behalf of Islamic forces in Somalia and of joining Al-Qaeda last year. Among them are British, American and French Muslims (6 & 7). In December 2006, invading Ethiopian troops took the capital Mogadishu from the ICU and restored the internationally recognized government, routing the Islamists and scattering the foreigners and Al-Qaeda fighters. “Zakharov believes that one of the reasons the Eritrean persons wanted to use the Ilyushin in the clandestine operations was because the freighter’s registration began with the letters UN and therefore might have been mistaken for a United Nations aircraft. When Zakharov discovered that Afeworki's desperate regime was using the plane for arms shipments and for flying the masked men from Somalia, he cancelled the contract. Zakharov first grew suspicious when he found that the seven-man crews were each being paid £2,500 bonuses for every flight. Contacted later during the operation, Tambi denied all knowledge of the deal. However, The Sunday Times has a copy of the contract signed in Moscow and Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, between Aerolift and Eriko Enterprise of Asmara on July 21. The first sanctions-busting arms flight landed at Mogadishu on July 26 and was followed by three arms shipments — a total of some 140 tons — over the next three days (For details see 6 & 7).” Asmara's Awful Alliances As indicated by a report on Indian Ocean Newsletter N° 1208 17/02/2007 the hitherto attempts made by the Afeworki’s hysterical regime to manipulate certain Ethiopian opposition groups to its advantage have only worsened the internal splits inside these opposition groups. For instance, despite the victorious military communiqués issued by Asmara, the Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front (EPPF, Ethiopian armed opposition), whose members undergo training in Eritrea, is has not been in any position to carry out military operations in Ethiopia that can make a serious dent in the incumbent TPLF-regime’s armed forces. Essentially, this group has completely fallen apart internally. Some of EPPF’s members are now accusing the commander, Meskeram Atalay, of abandoning them to flee to Germany where he has currently settled. They also call for the expulsion of Mussie Tegegne, whom they consider responsible for the internal split in their movement and the arrest of EPPF combatants by the Eritrean authorities (For details see 8). A different Ethiopian opposition movement that has become an irritant and a disuniting factor in the struggle against the EPRDF-regime in Ethiopia is the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Assisted and backed by Afeworki’s despotic regime, it has also become an issue to internal disagreement. The friction has been aggravated by the fiasco of Eritrean collaboration with the Somalia Islamists to create in Somalia a point of entry into Ethiopia for armed opposition groups like the OLF. Daoud Ibsa, Chairperson of the OLF, had already been considered too dependent on Eritrean strategy by a meeting of OLF partisans in Oslo in mid-December 2006, which he did not attend. Worldwide Daoud Ibsa is criticized for having operated policies which marginalized the OLF during the 2005 general election in Ethiopia. In consequence, the Oromo population in Ethiopia had not really paid attention to his call to boycott the election. Later on Daoud Ibsa accepted to form an alliance, that many Oromo activists consider “contrary to nature”, with the Alliance for Democracy (AFD), an opposition group based in Diaspora and assisted by Afeworki’s despotic regime. AFD claims to be a branch organ of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party (CUDP) in Ethiopia, which most OLF supporters mistakenly view as a party consisting “chauvinists” as its members (For details see 9). Furthermore, many Ethiopians in Diaspora are either irritated, skeptical about or opposed to AFD’s alliance with Afeworki’s regime in Asmara as Afeworki remains the archenemy of Ethiopia since the 1970s. Manipulated by Afeworki’s regime, the divisive work being injected by Andargachew Tsige, the leading person in AFD has seriously triggered CUDP supporters in Diaspora to split. Actually in early in 2006, Dr. Birhanu Nega and Andargachew Tsige contrived claiming that a 618 pages book was written in Amharic titled: “Yenetsanet Goh Siked: Likelebes yetemokerew ye'Ethiopia democracy" by Dr. Nega from Kaleti prison and published in Uganda by Andargachew Tsige. There is increasing skepticism and distrust among Ethiopians in Diaspora that a 618 pages book can only be written by Andargachew, whose name is actually indicated in the cover page of the book as the actual publisher in Uganda; and not in a tightly controlled prison cell as the claimant indicated it in this book. As a matter of fact, Andargachew used to be part of the EPRDF-transitional government when the ethnic genocidal crimes against the rural Amhara were committed. But, as a founding leader of AFD, he is now peddling backward to please the OLF-leadership and Afeworki’s regime by denying the massacre of thousands Amhara people in rural Ethiopia. Records of the recent past events in Ethiopia provide facts how the denial of the Arbagugu incidence in the early 1990s actually provoked Professor Asrat Woldeyes and Engineer Hailu Shawel to establish the now defunct AAPO (For details see 10) in defense of the Amhara. In any case, there remain many confusing implications in relation to Dr. Nega’s book. For instance, the book was published in Uganda and claimed to be smuggled into Ethiopia, where several copies of the book were sold in the first week of distribution alone in Addis Ababa. But how did the book enter into Ethiopia? How did it pass the EPRDF-security check points? Who was involved in the eventual distribution of the book? These are some of the quarries yet to be inquired (For details see 10 and 11). The thickset suspicion and speculation among many Ethiopians is that Andatgachew brought into play Dr. Birhanu Nega's name as the actual author of the book simply to make his AFD discourse that he wrote in Diaspora in order to amass contributions made on behalf of CUDP (For details see 10). The Grave Digger Dumped into a Despotic Ditch For long Issayas Afeworki’s despotic regime has been digging its own grave; it seems the time has ripe for him to face challenges from Eritrean opposition groups that continue to operate from neighboring Sudan and Ethiopia. As a matter of fact, in mid-February 2007 the Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA) launched a six-day congress in Addis Ababa to facilitate ways and hammer out a strategy towards the realization of a constitutional government to be elected by the Eritrean people. EDA is Eritrea's opposition umbrella embracing 13 sisterly Eritrean political organizations. In his opening address, the EDA Chairman, Berhane Yemane, told to delegates that this 1st General Congress focused on the political and economic tribulations in Eritrea, and pass resolutions on how to salvage Eritrean peoples from their ordeals. Indeed Afeworki’s one-man tyrannical regime has continued to rule hard-handed, the political and economic plights in Eritrea have thus continued to cause exodus and dispersion of young Eritrean people. Eritrea, under the tyranny of Isayas Afeworki, is being alienated from the rest of the world as well as from the African Union. Indeed, according to one of the coordinators of the EDA meeting, Debesay Beyene, the Eritrean government has been committing flagrant violations of human rights. "Eritrea has been made a country where democracy and justice are absent" (For details see 16). Therefore, EDA’s member organizations are working hard on how to decide, under their covenant, to put an end to Afeworki’s dictatorship in Eritrea. In connection to this, the Alliance will be intensifying their peaceful struggle in and outside of Eritrea. The 8-year old EDA is currently moving ahead in a manner that represents the voices of the people of Eritrea; and the Alliance will be taking all the opportunities that enable to intensify its diplomatic and peaceful struggle to root-out Afeworki’s crooked regime in Asmara. Actually, the congress has endorsed a political charter for the demise of the dictatorship in Eritrea. To this effect, it has now mapped-out a strategy, on how to dismantle Afeworki’s persistently repressive rule and tribulations eventually. As the two rival governments are on a stalemate and playing a tit-for-tat politics against one-another, opposition groups attempt to take advantage of this condition and battle through their own respective agendas but in vain. Primarily, unless Afeworki refrains from spreading his ethnic-venomous political propagation filled with hate and revenges his own deeds and creations will bring similar reaction from the regime on the Ethiopian side. To this effect, the accounts indicated above are evidential. Lessons Learned and Hints for the Way Forward The independent panel - the Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary commission - issued a binding ruling on the border in 2002, but Ethiopia has consistently refused to implement it. In actual fact, due to mistrust and dissatisfaction on issues of national concern both governments have intermittently returned close to reviving their armed conflict. Since the two regimes have failed time and again to agree on the already overdue-border demarcation issues, it is time to start the matter afresh from square one in order to accommodate all critical resentments coming from and aired by stakeholders on either side of the disputed buffer zone. And since neither government is actually willing to allow further arbitration actions, innovative and justifiable ideas including that of Ethiopia’s rightful access to the sea that have been persistently on the appeal by concerned citizens must be seriously taken into account and be given fair deal. Sources of constant tension Still there remain growing international concerns at the arbitration failure fully to implement a 2000 peace deal that ended the bloody Ethiopia-Eritrea border war that claimed nearly 80 000 lives and fears they may be returning once again to the battleground. That deal required both sides to accept as "final and binding" the ruling of the boundary commission, but when it announced its decision in 2002, Ethiopia rejected it outright, claiming that it accepted in principle but only with revisions and further face-to-face dialogues between the regime delegates. The bad and the ugly dispute flared-up once again due to the panel's decision that awarded the flashpoint border town of Badme to Eritrea. Ethiopia rejected outright claiming that the ruling must be altered since it will split families and villages existing on the border lines between the two countries. The result has been that the 1000km border remains un-demarcated and a source of constant tension persists with fears of a return to yet another conflict. The Ethiopian and Eritrean stakeholders alike have to face the good opportunities potentially there on the ground as well as the bad and the ugly challenges; they have to openly talk the talk and walk the walk in order to arrive at palatable and sustainable solutions that can revitalize the socio-economic conditions of the two poverty stricken nations. In light of what has been said, Healy and Plaut said: “the ongoing confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, six years after they signed a peace agreement” is on the record calling for both parties to reconsider matters for feasible settlement. In actual fact, Healy and Plaut appropriately call attention to the fact that the border decision shouldn’t be implemented in a nut-shell as it appears on paper; because the Algiers Agreement was basically a mistake as: … “The risks of signing up in advance to a final and binding adjudication did not seem to be fully appreciated by both parties at the time.” (Underline mine; and for details see 1). That means lost opportunities and sources of constant tension must be dealt with once and for all in order to broker a lasting peace between the two regimes. In connection with, the issue of Assab Port must be resolved instantly. Further discontent consistently coming to the fore by concerned Ethiopians is the issue with regard to Ethiopia’s rightful access to the sea. At the cost of reverberation, let me reiterate the following. Possible rationalization to be described for Ethiopia’s rightful access to the sea through the Assab port concern the following five prospective, namely: (a) Ethiopia needs an outlet to the sea in order to maintain its socio-economic and geopolitical security; (b) for quite a long while, Assab Port used to be part of the Wollo Administrative region until the early 1990s during which time this Port was prearranged by TPLF to Eritrea as a good will gesture and without the consent of or holding referendum by the 80 million Ethiopian peoples; (c) the 1993 Eritrean referendum was conducted on emergency grounds; without formally carrying-out the border demarcation prior to the 1993 de facto Eritrean independence inauguration date (For details see 15); (d) with its nearly 80 million peoples living landlocked inside Ethiopia, it feels like living in a closed house arrest devoid of having open access to the outer-world; and, (c) it is just a matter of time; keeping Ethiopia landlocked will also prolong the suffering of the peoples of Eritrea and Ethiopia alike as it will remain the source of constant tension and likely fear factor for future skirmishes between the two nations. (For details see 14). At the end of the day, Eritrea can only be a feasible nation when it forges the right and proper cooperation and proper ingredients for mutual coexistence with Ethiopia. Most Ethiopians have been saying this very opinion for quite a long while. Ultimately, notwithstanding Afeworki’s reaction towards such noble viewpoints, the Eritrean public is now getting the feel for it at its door.
Sure enough it will materialize in due
course of time. No matter whom Afeworki constantly make use of: TPLF, OLF, AFD, EPPF, UIC, Al Qaeda etc, peace, stability and economical prosperity will come to Eritrea mainly when the port of Assab is left as a corridor to the sea for Ethiopia. Click HERE to go to the source of this article. |